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ABSTRACT
Entertainment and Travel Costs (ETC) is a standard expenditure item for Chinese firms with an
annual amount equal to about 20 percent of total wage bills. We use this objective accounting
measure as a basis to analyze the composition of ETC and the effect of ETC on firm performance.
We rely on the predictions from a simple but plausible model of managerial decision-making to
identify components of ETC by examining how the total ETC responds to different environmental
variables. In our empirical analysis we find strong evidence that firms. ETC consists of a mix that
includes  bribery  to  government  officials  both  as  “grease  money”  and  “protection  money,”
expenditures to build relational capital with suppliers and clients, and managerial excesses. ETC
overall has a significantly negative effect on firm performance, but its negative effect is much less
pronounced for those firms located in cities with low quality government service, those who are
subject to severe government expropriation, and those who do not have strong relationship with





















Corruption is one of the central issues in developing and transitional economies, as evidenced
by the fact that the Copenhagen Consensus identi￿ed ￿Governance and Corruption￿ as one of
the global priority proposals (see Rose-Ackerman [28]). There are at least two crucial necessary
conditions in order to e⁄ectively curb corruption: ￿rst, we must have e⁄ective methods to detect
corruption; second and probably more importantly, we must know the institutional determinants
of corruption.
Yet due to its illicit nature corruption is notoriously di¢ cult to detect with objective data.
As a result, most of the existing literature on corruption relies either on micro-level subjective
surveys or country-speci￿c corruption perception indices (see, e.g. Ades and Di Tella [2], Mauro
[19] and Treisman [29] for recent contributions and Bardhan [3] for a literature review). However,
subjective survey data can su⁄er from a number of well-known biases (see, for example, Bertrand
and Mullainathan [4] for a recent exposition).
Recently a small but growing literature has proposed new approaches to look for evidence of
corruption. Olken [23] compares administrative data on the amount of rice distributed with survey
data on the amount actually received by households to measure corruption in an anti-poverty pro-
gram in Indonesia; similarly Olken [24] compares engineers￿estimate of the construction costs and
the actual book costs of road projects in Indonesia to provide objective measures of corruption.
While objective measures of corruption is obviously most desirable, it is often costly to audit all
public projects where corruption may occur. Moreover, corruption can occur in many situations
where an objective assessment is not possible. In such cases researchers have attempted to rely
on predictions from economic models for indirect evidence of corruption. For example, Duggan
and Levitt [9] use a simple game-theoretical model highlighting the nonlinear incentive structure of
promotion in Japanese sumo wrestling to analyze and ￿nd evidence of match rigging. Di Tella and
Schargrodsky [8] use the negative correlation between hospital input prices in Buenos Aires and
auditing intensity to infer that hospital procurement o¢ cers may be engaged in accepting bribes.
Khwaja and Mian [16] examine the relationship between whether ￿rms have politicians on their
board and their loan amount as well as default rate to make indirect inference of corruption in Pak-
istan. Hsieh and Moretti [12] infer corruption in Iraqi￿ s oil-for-food program from the underpricing
of Iraqi oils.
While ￿nding reliable and objective, albeit indirect, evidence of corruption is important, it
is equally critical ￿from a public policy viewpoint ￿to understand the institutional causes and
1economic consequences of corruption. All economists agree that corruption results from weak
institutions, however as argued in Acemoglu and Johnson [1], all weak institutions are not created
equal. They proposed a dichotomy of ￿property rights￿and ￿contracting institutions￿and argued
that weakness of the two sets of institutions lead to di⁄erent responses between economic parties and
imply di⁄erent social consequences.1 Due to data limitations, empirical work has shed little light
on the more detailed institutional causes of corruption. Moreover most of the existing empirical
research on the e⁄ect of corruption typically focus on whether corrupt governments lower the rates
of economic growth at the macro level (see, for example Mauro [19]). Unfortunately there is no
systematic evidence regarding the private return to bribing government o¢ cials at the ￿rm level.2
Our paper makes three contributions to the vast literature on corruption. First, in the spirit
of Duggan and Levitt [9], we rely on the predictions from a simple behavioral model of Chinese
managers and use indirect inference approach to detect corruption. Second, we empirically investi-
gate various institutional determinants in ￿rms￿corruption decisions. Third, we examine how the
private returns to ￿rms from corruptive activities vary with institutional factors.
We use a unique data set of 3,470 Chinese ￿rms in our empirical analysis. The main object of
interest is ￿Entertainment and Travel Costs￿(henceforth, ETC), which is a standard expenditure
item in the accounting books of Chinese ￿rms. The information about ETC in our data set is
directly taken from ￿rms￿accounting books and thus is not subject to the biases associated with
subjective survey data. As its name indicates, it is used to cover entertainment (including eating,
drinking, gifts, Karaoke and sports club membership, etc.) and travel expenditures.3 Besides
legitimate business travel and other expenses, Chinese ￿rms commonly use the ETC accounting
category to reimburse expenditures used to bribe government o¢ cials, clients and suppliers, or
1￿Property right institutions￿are weak when ￿rms are subject to expropriation by government o¢ cials or other
individuals. Firms as a result may be forced to pay bribes in exchange for protection (or less expropriation). Cor-
ruption in such cases does not play a socially productive role. In contrast, ￿contracting institutions￿are weak when
governments do not provide high-quality services to facilitate trade, such as slow license approvals or erratic contract
enforcement. Firms will be induced to bribe government o¢ cials to ￿greases the wheel.￿ Corruption under such
circumstances can increase social welfare by ￿making things work￿ in an otherwise rigid and sti￿ ing bureaucratic
system (see for example, Lui [18] for a formal argument, and Kaufmann and Wei [15] for an empirical inquiry).
2Fisman and Svesson [10] is the only paper we are aware of that examines how bribery a⁄ects ￿rm growth using
￿rm-level data from Uganda. They rely on self-reported bribery payments in their analysis and ￿nd a strong negative
e⁄ect of bribery payments on ￿rm growth.
3See Washington Post August 22, 2005 for a report on how such practices a⁄ect U.S. multinationals operating in
China.
2simply managerial excess.4 Fake or in￿ ated receipts are submitted for reimbursement of illegitimate
expenses. While the central government is aware of such practices, to prove that a particular
expenditure is illegitimate is close to impossible, probably because in China it is still the norm to
do business transactions in cash, thus such practices are de facto legal. On average each ￿rm in our
data sets spends = Y946,400 (more than $110,000) annually on ETC.5 The average ETC expenditures
is about 20 percent of the average ￿rm￿ s total wage bill, about 2.6 percent of its total sales revenues
and about 4.0 percent of its total value-added.6 Among all listed manufacturing ￿rms in Korea,
ETC expenditure is about 0.74 percent of their total sales in 2000-03.7 Thus as a percentage of total
sales, Chinese ￿rms in our sample spend about 2.5 times more on ETC than Korean manufacturing
￿rms.
To infer from the total ETC expenditure about its components the key empirical challenge is
that ETC likely contains both legitimate business expenses and corruptive expenses. Similar to
the indirect inference approach of Duggan and Levitt [9], we develop a simple model of Chinese
manager￿ s decisions over how much to spend on three di⁄erent categories of expenditures: (1) nor-
mal business expenditures (to build relationship capital with suppliers and clients); (2) corruption
payments to government o¢ cials in exchange for lower expropriation and/or better service; (3)
managerial excesses (e.g., taking family and friends to restaurants, clubs and travels at the ￿rms￿
expense). The predictions from our model indicate that, ceteris paribus, if the expropriation by
local government (proxied by e⁄ective tax rates) is responsive to bribery payments, total ETC will
be higher for ￿rms more prone to expropriation; similarly, if the quality of local government service
is responsive to bribery payments, ￿rms will bribe more in cities with lower quality of government
service; in contrast, if local governments are not responsive to bribery payments in their expropri-
ation levels or quality of service ￿thus ￿rms will choose not to bribe at all ￿our model predicts
that the total ETC will decrease in government expropriation and increase in government service
quality. We also derive comparative predictions about how the total ETC is a⁄ected by corporate
governance and ￿rms￿relational capital with clients and suppliers. We use these comparative stat-
4Such practice is not limited to China. Bodrock [5] documented similar cases in Ukraine.
5In this paper, we will use = Y as the symbol for Chinese Yuan.
6Our numbers are roughly consistent with estimates in the aggregate. Hu [13] estimates that in 1997 Chinese
￿rms and government agencies spent more than = Y200 billion (about $25 billion) on eating and drinking, and another
= Y284 billion (about $34 billion U.S.) on tourism and overseas travel. The total expenditure of = Y484 billion accounts
for about 6.5 percent of China￿ s GDP (about = Y7.4 trillion).
7We thank Keun Lee who calculated this number from Korea Investors Services database.
3ics predictions as the basis of our empirical analysis to identify components of ETC by examining
how ETC responds to di⁄erent environmental variables that we construct for each ￿rm.
We ￿nd that ETC is higher when government expropriation is more severe, and when the quality
of government service is lower (Table 2). From the theoretical predictions of the model, these ￿nd-
ings suggest that corrupt payments to government o¢ cials account for a signi￿cant portion of ETC.
Moreover, they also suggest that ￿rms pay bribes both to buy ￿protection￿against government
expropriation and to ￿grease the wheel￿in buying government services.
These ￿ndings are further reinforced in our analysis of the e⁄ects of ETC on ￿rm performance
as measured by Pro￿t/Sales Ratio (Tables 3) and TFP (Table 4). Overall, we ￿nd that ETC
negatively a⁄ect ￿rms￿pro￿tability and TFP, a result that is robust when we instrument a ￿rm￿ s
ETC by its city- and district-industry averages to deal with endogeneity issues. This result in itself
suggests that a big part of ETC is managerial excesses. This conclusion is corroborated by our
￿nding that the negative e⁄ects of ETC on ￿rm performance are much less pronounced in ￿rms
with better corporate governance, i.e. those ￿rms with greater private ownership and those that
have ￿red a manager in the previous four years.
More importantly, we ￿nd that the negative e⁄ect of ETC on ￿rms￿pro￿t and TFP is signif-
icantly less pronounced for ￿rms with higher tax burdens and for ￿rms receiving poorer quality
of local government service. These ￿ndings strongly suggest that components of ETC are spent
as ￿protection money￿to reduce government expropriation and ￿grease money￿in exchange for
better government service.
Our ￿ndings also suggest that a signi￿cant portion of ETC is used productively to build rela-
tional capital with suppliers and clients. Not surprisingly, we ￿nd that ￿rms that sell their main
products to other provinces spend more on ETC than those who do not, suggesting that ETC
increase in the di¢ culties of maintaining long-distance relationships.8 More interestingly, we ￿nd
that money spent on ETC tend to be more productive for ￿rms with weaker relationships with
their main suppliers and clients.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we present a simple model to
illustrate our identi￿cation strategy. Section 3 describes our data and presents descriptive statistics.
In Section 4, we examine the determinants of total ETC expenditures. Section 5 investigates how
ETC expenditures a⁄ect ￿rm performance, and Section 6 concludes.
8However, some of this e⁄ect could arise because ￿rms doing business in other provinces may have to pay additional
bribes to government o¢ cials in those provinces.
42 A Theoretical Model and Identi￿cation Strategy
In this section we propose a simple but plausible model of ETC spending by Chinese man-
agers. The predictions from the model are the key to our empirical strategy to distinguish di⁄erent
components of ETC.
Consider a manager who decides the amount of ￿rm funds to spend in three categories:
￿ Normal business expenditures, denoted by xr; to build relational capital with suppliers and
clients. This, among other things, includes travel expenses to meet suppliers and clients;
￿ Corruption payments (bribes) to government o¢ cials, denoted by xb: We furthermore di-
vide xb into two sub-components: bribes in exchange for government services ￿the ￿grease
money￿￿is denoted by xg; and bribes in exchange for lower government expropriation ￿the
￿protection money￿￿is denoted by xp. We can also think of xg as bribes to service-related
government agencies such as licensing and utilities etc. and xp as bribes to tax agencies. Of
course xb ￿ xg + xp;
￿ Managerial excess, denoted by xc, that goes directly to the manager￿ s own pocket or to his/her
family and friends.
By de￿nition, the private consumption xc is simply a deduction from ￿rm pro￿t. The bribes
to government o¢ cials (xg and xp), as well as the relational investment xr, however, may have a
positive e⁄ect on ￿rm￿ s pro￿t. We now detail how xg;xp and xr a⁄ect ￿rm performance.
We assume that the ￿rm has a potential pro￿t opportunity Q > 0.9 The probability that Q
can be realized, or, equivalently, how much of Q can be realized, is denoted by q (Kg;Kr), where
Kg is the actual quality of service a ￿rm receives from the government, and Kr is the ￿rm￿ s actual
relational capital with its suppliers and clients. Our interpretation is that the ￿rm needs the
cooperation from both the government o¢ cials and from the ￿rm￿ s suppliers and clients in order to
realize potential pro￿t opportunities. We make the following natural assumptions about function
q (￿;￿):
Assumption 1: q (￿;￿) is strictly increasing and concave in both arguments; moreover, Kg and Kr
are complements, i.e., @2q=@Kg@Kr > 0:
9In our empirical analysis, Q will be approximated by a function of ￿rm characteristics including its age, size,
location and industry a¢ liation.
5The ￿grease money￿bribes to government o¢ cials xg and the relational investment expenditure on
suppliers and clients xr a⁄ect ￿rm performance through their e⁄ect on Kg and Kr: Let K0
g be the
baseline quality of service from the government with no additional ￿grease money￿bribes; and K0
r
be the baseline level of the ￿rm￿ s relational capital with its suppliers and clients, which measures
the cooperation that the ￿rm can expect from them without any additional relational investment.
We assume that xg and xr a⁄ect Kg and Kr respectively as follows:
Kg = K0
g + agxg; (1)
Kr = K0
r + arxr; (2)
where the parameters ag ￿ 0 and ar ￿ 0 measure the e⁄ectiveness of these expenditures.
The ￿protection money￿ bribe xp a⁄ects the level of government expropriation as measured
by the ￿rm￿ s e⁄ective tax rate t. A parsimonious but plausible way to model how much taxes a
Chinese ￿rm typically pays is that it depends on three factors:
￿ The o¢ cial tax rate for the ￿rm￿ s type, denoted by t0;
￿ The baseline government expropriation in the absence of any additional bribe to the govern-
ment o¢ cials, denoted by K0
p. Presumably K0
p itself depends on both the general level of
expropriation of the city government and the bargaining power of the ￿rm;
￿ The ￿rm￿ s ￿protection money￿bribes, denoted by xp; to tax-related government agencies in
exchange for lower expropriation.













where Kp is the actual level of government expropriation and it is a⁄ected by ￿protection money￿
bribes xp as follows:
Kp = K0
p ￿ apxp; (4)
where ap ￿ 0 measures the e⁄ectiveness of the ￿rm￿ s bribes xp in reducing government expropria-
tion. We assume that:
Assumption 2: r(￿) is strictly increasing and concave.









q (Kg;Kr)Q ￿ (xc + xr + xg + xp): (5)
It is worth noting that here we make the simplifying assumption that the tax base for Chinese ￿rms
is revenue instead of gross pro￿t.10
We assume that the ￿owner￿of the ￿rm observes only the total net pro￿t ￿ and managerial
excess xc, but cannot directly distinguish the other elements of ETC expenses xr;xg;xp.11; 12 The
￿rm ￿owner￿decides whether to retain the manager at the end of the period based on the current
period net pro￿t and the observed managerial excess xc.13 The probability that the manager will
be retained for the next period is assumed to be:
￿(￿;xc;￿￿;￿c) = 1 ￿ ￿e￿(￿￿￿￿￿cxc); (6)
where the parameters ￿ 2 (0;1);￿￿ > 0 and ￿c > 0 measure the corporate governance of the ￿rm:
￿ can be considered as the natural rate of managerial turnover; higher values of ￿￿ imply that the
manager is to a greater degree held responsible for the ￿rm￿ s ￿nancial performance; and higher
values of ￿c means better monitoring of managerial excess.14; 15 The function ￿(￿;￿;￿￿;￿c) nicely
captures the idea that the manager is more likely to be retained if he makes a higher pro￿t and
indulges in less managerial excess.
10This assumption is much closer to reality that an alternative assumption that the tax base is net pro￿t. In our
sample, many ￿rms had net losses (in fact, the average pro￿t over total sales is about ￿8:8 percent) yet they all paid
positive taxes.
11By ￿rm ￿owner￿we mean the party in the ￿rm who decides on hiring and ￿ring top managers. For corporations,
this means the boards of directors; for state-owned ￿rms, this means the government bureau supervising the ￿rm;
and for privately owned ￿rms, it is the owner of the ￿rm.
12A more realistic assumption that the ￿owner￿of the ￿rm observes only a noisy signal of managerial excess xc
does not change the qualitative results.
13We abstract away from explicit incentive contracts for simplicity. Adding some pro￿t-sharing, as long as it is not
too large, in the manager￿ s payo⁄ function will not change the qualitative results of the model, but can substantially
complicate the analysis.
14If managerial excess xc is observed with noise, then the precision of the signal (which measures the owner￿ s
monitoring technology) will appear in parameter ￿c:
15We implicitly assume here that ￿rm owners face various constraints (such as veri￿ability, enforceability and legal
constraints, etc.) in designing the incentive systems for their managers; and thus ￿￿ and ￿c represent the optimal
solution under those constraints.
7Finally, let V > 0 be the manager￿ s continuation value from being retained and let ￿ 2 (0;1)
























The main prediction of the model is summarized in Proposition 1 whose proof is relegated to
Appendix A.
Proposition 1 (Identi￿cation of ETC Components)
A1. For i 2 fr;p;gg; x￿
i = 0 if ai = 0;
A2. For i 2 fr;gg; the total ETC is increasing in K0
i if ai = 0;
A3. If ap = 0; the total ETC is decreasing in K0
p.
B1. For i 2 fr;p;gg; x￿
i > 0 if ai is positive and su¢ ciently large;
B2. For i 2 fr;gg; the total ETC is decreasing in K0
i if ai is positive and su¢ ciently large;
B3. The total ETC is increasing in K0
p if ap is positive and su¢ ciently large.
Proposition 1 is the key prediction of the model that we rely on to identify the ETC components.
If, for example, the ￿grease money￿ xg is not an important component of the ￿rm￿ s ETC (i.e.,
ag = 0), Part A2 of Proposition 1 indicates that the ￿rm￿ s total ETC expenditure should be
increasing in K0
g, which as we explain above measures the baseline quality of government service.
On the other hand, if xg is indeed an important component of the ￿rm￿ s ETC (i.e., ag is positive and
su¢ ciently large), Part B2 of Proposition 1 indicates that we should expect the ￿rm￿ s total ETC
to be decreasing in K0
g. The distinct e⁄ects of K0
r and K0
p on the ￿rm￿ s total ETC expenditures




p, we can empirically verify whether ai is zero or su¢ ciently positive for
i 2 fr;p;gg. This is exactly our empirical strategy.
Identi￿cation of managerial excess xc is somewhat di⁄erent. In fact, our speci￿cation of the
manager￿ s payo⁄function (7) assumes that the manager will always choose a positive level of xc. Let
us consider how managerial incentive intensity represented by the corporate governance variable ￿￿
and ￿c in the model a⁄ects total ETC expenditure. Suppose ￿￿ and ￿c are both positive, then from
8the proof of Proposition 1 in Appendix A, x￿
p;x￿
r;x￿
g are all independent of ￿￿ and ￿c. However,
x￿
c is decreasing in ￿c (see Equation 12 noting that the cash ￿ ow ’￿ is independent of ￿c): Thus
the total ETC is decreasing in ￿c: In contrast x￿
c can be either decreasing in ￿￿ (when ￿￿ and ’￿
are relatively small), or increasing in ￿￿ (when ￿￿ and ’￿ are relatively large). The reason for the
latter is that if pro￿t is weighted heavily in managerial retention, then a manager may choose a
higher managerial excess once the cash ￿ ow is high, since his job will likely be secure. Thus, our
model makes an ambiguous prediction about how the total ETC is a⁄ected by the ￿rm￿ s ￿￿:
Proposition 2 summarizes the model￿ s implications about the ￿rm￿ s net pro￿t. It is proved
formally in Appendix B.
Proposition 2 (Firm Performance) The optimal net pro￿t ￿￿ is increasing in K0
r and K0
g;
and decreasing in K0
p.
Because the predictions in Proposition 2 do not depend on whether ai; i 2 fr;p;gg is zero
or su¢ ciently positive, Proposition 2 does not provide a direct test of the importance of ETC
components. But evidence consistent with it certainly lends support to our model as a whole.
2.1 Discussions of Modelling Assumptions
We made an important linearity assumption in the speci￿cations of the ￿production equation￿
for Kg;Kr and Kp [see Equations (1), (2) and (4)]. While admittedly restrictive, this type of
accumulation technology is commonly used especially in the economic growth literature. The
qualitative results of our model should still hold, though not as clean, if the actual accumulation
technologies are approximately but not exactly linear.
In our model we focused on the manager￿ s single-period decision problem with the continuation
payo⁄ modelled as a constant V: Presumably dynamic considerations are pertinent when parts of
ETC expenditures are equivalent to investments in long-term relationships with the government
o¢ cials, suppliers and clients. The formulation of the manager￿ s dynamic optimization problem
in (7) is valid only in a stationary world. This modelling assumption is partly for simplicity and
partly out of necessity because we only have one-period information on Entertainment and Travel
Costs for the ￿rms in our data.
We illustrated our identi￿cation strategy by considering a representative Chinese ￿rm. In empir-
ically implementing the identi￿cation strategy, we rely on cross-￿rm variations in many dimensions.
In fact ￿rm heterogeneity is the source of variations that allows us to test Proposition 1. For ex-
ample, as we mentioned in footnote 9, ￿rms￿pro￿t opportunities Q are allowed to vary by city,





3 Data and Measurements of Key Variables
3.1 Two Firm-Level Surveys
Our data come from two ￿rm-level surveys conducted jointly by the World Bank and the
Enterprise Survey Organization of China. The ￿rst survey, ￿elded during 2000-02, covers 2,400
￿rms from 18 cities, representatively located across ￿ve regions of China. The second survey covers
1,070 ￿rms located in 15 cities of Liaoning Province during 2001-03. Two cities in Liaoning Province,
Benxi and Dalian, appear in both surveys, so there are 31 cities in total in the two surveys. Figure
1 shows the geographic coverage of the ￿rst survey, and indicates the location of Liaoning province.
It also groups the 18 cities in the ￿rst survey into ￿ve regions. The other 13 cities in Liaoning
Province in the second survey are not depicted in Figure 1.
[Figure 1 About Here]
In the ￿rst survey, either 100 or 150 ￿rms were randomly sampled for each city from an electronic
database of ￿rms subject to the following constraints. First, ￿rms are selected to ensure that both
manufacturing and service industry ￿rms are adequately represented.16 Second, only ￿rms that
satisfy minimum size requirement (measured by number of employees) are sampled.17 The second
survey covered all major cities in Liaoning Province. 80 ￿rms were sampled in the cities of Shenyang
and Dalian, the two largest cities in the province, and 70 ￿rms were sampled in all other 13 cities.18
The two surveys cover a combined total of 3,470 ￿rms located in 31 cities that are at very di⁄erent
16The manufacturing industries include apparel and leather goods, electronic equipment, electronic components,
consumer products, vehicles and vehicle parts. The service industries include accounting and related services, adver-
tising and marketing, business logistics services, communication services, and information technology services.
17The minimum number of employees for ￿rms in the sample is 20 in manufacturing industries and 15 in service
industries. The size criterion was loosened when there were not enough ￿rms from a particular sector in a city. As a
result, roughly 3 percent of ￿rms in our sample have less than 15 employees.
18The 13 other cities are Dalian Deveopment Zone, Anshan, Fushun, Benxi, Dandong, Jinzhou, Yingkou, Fuxin,
Liaoyang, Tieling, Chaoyang, Pangjin, Huludao. We treat Dalian Development Zone as a separate city because it
has relatively autonomous status and is signi￿cantly di⁄erent from Dalian in general. The sample of ￿rms in Dalian
Development Zone is drawn independently from the ￿rms in Dalian.
10stages of economic development. Within this sample of cities, GDP per capita (in 2002 value)
ranges from = Y3400 to = Y46,400 (equivalently to about $400 to $5,000).
The questionnaires for the two surveys are identical for the variables we use in our analysis
and they consist of two parts.19 The ￿rst part is ￿lled out by ￿rms￿senior managers and asks for
qualitative information on the ￿rm; the second part covers ￿nancial and quantitative information
about the ￿rms￿production and operation, and is obtained from personal interviews with the ￿rm￿ s
chief accountant. Our data sets thus contain detailed information about ￿rm characteristics and
performance. the average (median) ￿rm in our sample has 572 (112) employees, and has been in
business for 15 (9) years. Its annual total sales revenue is about = Y191 (9.4) Million. While the
average ￿rm makes a loss equal to approximately 10 percent of its total sales, the median ￿rm
makes a meager pro￿t of .4 percent of its total sales.20 Close to 60 percent of the ￿rms in our
sample sell their main products to other provinces.
3.2 Measurement of Key Variables
Measurement of ETC. The ￿rst variable of central interest is Entertainment and Travel Costs.
This is a readily available category in the accounting book of every ￿rm and obtained from the
second part of the survey with the ￿rm￿ s chief accountant. These expenditures are measured with
little error because each reimbursement item in this category needs a ￿receipt.￿ Entertainment
and Travel Costs are supposedly for the purpose of reimbursing expenses related to conducting
normal businesses. However, accounting practice in China is su¢ ciently lax so that managers may
get reimbursed for almost any kind of entertainment and travel for any purpose, often with fake or
in￿ ated receipts.
Entertainment and Travel Costs represent a signi￿cant portion of ￿rms￿expenditures. The
ratio of Entertainment and Travel Costs to Total Wage Bill at the ￿rm level has a median of 8.8
percent, and a mean of 19 percent.21 The ratio of Entertainment and Travel Costs to Value-Added
19The survey instrument is available from the authors upon request.
20The widespread losses among the sampled ￿rms may be related to genuine losses in state-owned ￿rms and more
pro￿t hiding (see Johnson, et al [14] and Cai, et al [7]). Due to data limitations we are unable to examine whether
pro￿t hiding is correlated with the variables used in our analysis. Thus our results in Section 5 need to be interpreted
with caution. The other measure of ￿rm performance, productivity, estimated from value-added or total sales data,
is more immune to these problems and hence more reliable. As will be shown later, we reach similar qualitative
conclusions whether we measure ￿rm performance by pro￿tability or by productivity.
21We exclude the ￿rms whose Entertainment Travel Cost/Total Wage Bill ratio is among the top 5 percentile in
calculating this mean to ensure that our calculation is not driven by outliers.
11has a median of 1.8 percent and a mean of 4.0 percent. In our empirical analysis, we normalize
Entertainment and Travel Costs by Total Sales, and from now on the term ETC refers to the
Entertainment and Travel Costs/Total Sales ratio. In our data ETC has a median of 1 percent,
and a mean of 2.6 percent.22 ETC also varies substantially across ￿rms, with a sample standard
deviation of 6.2 percent.
Across cities, the ￿rm average of ETC ranges from 0.8 percent in Jiangmeng, a coastal and
relatively a› uent city, to 5 percent in Guiyang, an inland and relatively backward city. Panel A of
Figure 2 shows a clear negative relationship between the average ETC (ETC averaged over ￿rms
in the city) and the logarithm of the city￿ s per capita GDP.23
[Figure 2 About Here]
Measurement of K0
g: Our identi￿cation strategy presented in Section 2 relies on the empirical
relationship between ETC and key environment variables K0
g;K0
p and K0
r: Here and below we
describe how these variables are proxied in our empirical analysis. Recall that K0
g is meant to
capture the baseline quality of government service in the absence of additional bribes. We proxy
K0
g for each ￿rm in our data by the manager￿ s answer to the following question: ￿Among the
government o¢ cials that your ￿rm regularly interacts with, what is the percentage that tends to
help the ￿rm develop?￿ The answer to this question re￿ ects the ￿rm￿ s evaluation of the tendency
of government o¢ cials to help them; hence we will hereafter call this variable ￿Government Help.￿
Higher level of ￿Government Help￿implies higher K0
g: ￿Government Help￿is a ￿rm-speci￿c measure
of government helpfulness that depends on the overall government quality and the lagged relational
capital each ￿rm has with government o¢ cials. Panel B of Figure 2 graphs average ETC against
average ￿Government Help￿ measure for all cities in our data. Note that by construction the
average ￿Government Help￿in a city is bounded between zero and one, and it di⁄ers greatly across
the cities with a mean of .364 and standard deviation of .334. Panel B illustrates that ￿rms tend
to spend less on ETC in cities in which the government is perceived to be more helpful.
Measurement of K0
p: Recall that K0
p is the baseline government expropriation in the absence
of any additional bribe to the government o¢ cials. For each ￿rm we proxy K0
p by its ￿Total Tax
Burden in the Previous Year,￿as measured by total taxes divided by sales in the previous year. This
22Firms with ETC at the top 0.5 percentile (a total of 19 ￿rms) are excluded in calculating the mean to ensures
that our calculation is not driven by outliers.
23The data used in all graphs in Figure 2 are reported in Table A1.
12variable represents the extent of government expropriation if the manager does not give additional
bribes to government o¢ cials. This variable is taken from surveys with ￿rm accountants. Unique
features of Chinese tax system generate a substantial amount of across-￿rm variation in the tax
burdens. Since Chinese ￿rms pay both a central government and a local government tax, the ￿rst
reason for tax burden variation is that the central government tax rates di⁄er across ￿rm types
(e.g., tax incentives to attract foreign investments) and across regions (e.g., negotiations between
the central government and provinces, tax reductions for special economic zones). Second, within
the same city the local government often imposes di⁄erent levels of local taxes. Third, tax law
enforcement and collection e⁄orts di⁄er greatly across cities and across ￿rms within each city,
so a ￿rm￿ s actual tax burden depends on the vigilance level of local tax o¢ cials and the ￿rm￿ s
relationship with them. These reasons explain why the actual tax burden varies so greatly across
cities and across ￿rms in the same city. Firms in our sample on average paid taxes equal to 7.2
percent of their total sales, with a standard deviation of 10.1 percent. The lowest average tax rate
is Shenzhen￿ s 4.6 percent, and the highest is Guiyang￿ s 10.9 percent.
Panel C of Figure 2 plots average ETC against the average tax burden in the previous year at
the city level. The graph shows a strong positive relationship, suggesting that ETC may be used
to cushion the blunt of government expropriations.
Measurement of K0
r: To measure a ￿rm￿ s baseline relational capital with its suppliers and clients
K0
r, we construct a variable called ￿Years of Relationship,￿which is the sum of the years that the
￿rm has known its most important supplier and the years that it has known its most important
client. This variable shows substantial variation across cities, with a low of 7 years in Lanzhou
on average to a high of 9.1 years on average in Dandong. The sample mean is 8.3 years, and the
sample standard deviation is 2.1 years. Proposition 1 indicates that if managers use entertainment
expenditures to build contracting relationships with their suppliers and clients, ETC should be
negatively correlated with ￿Years of relationship;￿ otherwise, ETC and ￿Years of Relationship￿
should be positively correlated. Panel D of Figure 2 plots ETC against the logarithm of ￿Years of
Relationship.￿ The slope is small but negative.
Measurement of Corporate Governance/Managerial Incentives. In our theoretical frame-
work, corporate governance/managerial incentive parameters ￿c and ￿￿ both a⁄ect the manager￿ s
ETC expenditure. However the incentive structure for managers in Chinese ￿rms is not at all
13transparent, and no good data are available on managerial incentives.24 We use two measures of
corporate governance to gauge how a manager￿ s incentives are aligned with those of the ￿rm. The
￿rst is ￿Private Ownership,￿which measures the share of a ￿rm owned by private parties, both
domestic and foreign. Private owners are more motivated by pro￿ts and are thus likely to have
stronger incentives to monitor managers￿behavior. In our sample, the share of private ownership
varies across ￿rms from 0 (purely state-owned) to 1 (purely private), and the average ￿rm in our
sample has 35 percent of private ownership, with a standard deviation of 45.5 percent. The city
averages vary from 81 percent in Wenzhou, a coastal city known for its private enterprises, to less
than 17 percent in Fushun and Shenyang, two Northeastern cities. Panel E of Figure 2 plots average
ETC against private ownership at the city level, revealing a weak relationship between them.
The second proxy of managerial incentives is a dummy variable indicating whether any senior
manager (including general managers and deputy managers) had been ￿red in the previous four
years, which we call ￿Managerial Dismissal.￿ One expects that the incidence of senior manager
dismissal indicates strong monitoring of top managers and hence greater pressure on current man-
agers to improve ￿rm performance. In our sample, 19 percent of ￿rms ￿red a senior manager in
the four years prior to the interview. There is substantial variation in this variable across cities.
In the city of Yingkou, for example, 33 percent of the ￿rms ￿red a manager in the previous four
years, while only 7 percent of the ￿rms in the city of Lanzhou did so. Panel F of Figure 2 does not
show a clear relationship between managerial dismissal and ETC.
Other Variables. We also include in our empirical analysis basic ￿rm characteristics such as
the number of employees, ￿rm age, and whether the ￿rm sells to other provinces. Table 1 lists the
detailed de￿nition of each variable and its mean and standard deviation.
[Table 1 About Here]
4 What Firms Spend More ETC?
In this section, we empirically examine the determinants of ETC, using regression speci￿cations
suggested by our simple model in Section 2. The dependent variable is the ETC, and the list
of explanatory variables varies by speci￿cation. For each regression speci￿cation we only use the
sample of ￿rms for which there are no missing values for any of the explanatory variables. For each
24The main reason is that most ￿rms in our sample are not public ￿rms, so they do not have to disclose compen-
sations for managers.
14￿rm, we use the data from the last year in the respective survey because the Entertainment and
Travel Cost is observed only for the last year. The speci￿cation we estimate is
ETCijc = ￿1jINDj + ￿2Xc + ￿3Zi + ￿4Xi + ￿ijc (8)
where the subscripts ijc stands for ￿rm i in industry j located in city c: We include industry dummy
INDj to ￿lter out industry-speci￿c needs for normal business expenditures in ETC; Xc is a city-
level variable aimed to control for various aspects related to economic development. Depending
on speci￿cations, Xc will either be the logarithm of the per capita GDP of the city where ￿rm is
located, denoted by ln(GDP_PCc); or simply a city dummy. The vector Zi is a list of basic ￿rm
characteristics including ￿rm size (logarithm of the number of employees), age (logarithm of 1 +
￿rm age), and whether it sells to other provinces; the vector Xi includes the variables discussed in
the above section: ￿Government Help￿(proxying K0
g); ￿Total Tax Burden in the Previous Year￿
(proxying K0
p), ￿Years of Relationship￿ (proxying K0
r); ￿Private Ownership￿ and ￿Managerial
Dismissal￿(proxing for corporate governance).
[Table 2 about Here]
Table 2 presents the basic results from a series of OLS regressions. Column (1) presents the re-
sults from the simplest regression with only controls of basic ￿rm characteristics and ln(GDP_PCc).
We gradually add more and more controls in Column (2) to Column (6). In Column (7) we include
city dummies instead of ln(GDP_PCc) to more ￿ exibly control for city characteristics.25 Since
the estimates from di⁄erent speci￿cations di⁄er little, we shall focus our discussion on the complete
speci￿cations reported in column (6).26
Our results show that larger ￿rms, as measured by the number of employees, incur lower ETC.
A one standard deviation increase in the logarithm of number of employees (1.48, see Table 1)
reduces ETC by about .9 percentage points, which is a 35 percent reduction for ETC considering
that the mean in our sample for ETC is 2.6 percentage points. This suggests that entertainment
and travel costs exhibit strong economies of scale. In all speci￿cations we do not ￿nd a robust
relationship between ETC and ￿rm age.
25Since ln(GDP_PCc) is embedded in the city dummies, we cannot include this variable in the column (7) when
city dummies are included.
26A comparison of the coe¢ cient estimates across Columns (1) to (6) show remarkable stability, indicating that
multicollinearity is not a serious issue.
15We ￿nd that ￿rms in cities with higher per capita GDP tend to have lower ETC, consistent
with the raw correlation demonstrated in Panel A of Figure 2. The coe¢ cient estimate suggests
that a one standard deviation increase in log per capita GDP (0.46, see Table 1) reduces ETC by
.2 percentage points, or 8 percent reduction of the mean ETC level of .026.
In speci￿cation reported in Column (6) we ￿nd that the proxy for K0
g ￿￿Government Help￿￿
reduces ETC, consistent with the raw correlation reported in Panel B of Figure 2. A one standard
deviation increase in ￿Government Help￿ decrease ETC by .2 percentage points. By the iden-
ti￿cation results in Proposition 1, this suggests that part of ETC is spent to entertain or bribe
government o¢ cials in exchange for higher quality of government services, thus providing support
for the ￿grease money￿view of corruption.
We ￿nd that the proxy for baseline government expropriation K0
p, ￿Tax Burden in the Previous
Year,￿has a strong and positive e⁄ect on ETC. This con￿rms the positive raw correlation between
lagged tax burden and ETC depicted in Panel C of Figure 2. In the speci￿cation reported in
Column (6), ￿Tax Burden in the Previous Year￿is signi￿cant at the 5 percent level; and it implies
that a one standard deviation increase in this variable will increase ETC by 38 percent. Again from
Proposition 1, this evidence suggests that part of ETC is spent as ￿protection money￿bribes to
government o¢ cials in exchange for lower expropriation.27
We ￿nd that the variable ￿Years of Relationship￿proxing for baseline relational capital with its
suppliers and clients K0
r has a negative, though statistically insigni￿cant, e⁄ect on ETC. However,
we do ￿nd that ￿rms that sell to other provinces tend to have higher ETC. Other things being
equal, ETC in ￿rms that sell to other provinces is .4 percentage points higher than that in ￿rms
that do not. By Proposition 1, these ￿ndings are consistent with the view that managers also use
ETC to conduct normal business and to build relationships with suppliers and clients.
Our ￿ndings regarding the e⁄ect of corporate governance variables are mixed. ￿Private Own-
ership￿does not have a robust and statistically signi￿cant e⁄ect on ETC. However, we ￿nd that
￿Managerial Dismissal￿has strong and positive e⁄ects on ETC. The coe¢ cient estimate is statisti-
cally signi￿cant across various speci￿cations, and the magnitude is large: ETC in ￿rms that ￿red at
least one senior manager in the previous four years is .8 percentage point higher than that in those
￿rms that did not, accounting for a 31 percent increase relative to the mean ETC of 2.6 percentage
points. If a ￿rm that had ￿red a senior manager before indeed has better corporate governance, this
27Given that we control for city level characteristics and the ￿rm￿ s industry, it is reasonable that the random
shocks a ￿rm experiences each period are serially independent. Under this assumption the lagged tax burden will be
independent of ￿ijc:
16￿nding is consistent with our model for the case of large ￿￿ (the weight on pro￿t in the managerial
evaluation system) and large ’ (expected cash ￿ ow). It is also possible that managers at these
￿ring ￿rms tend to spend entertainment on productive uses much more than their peers at ￿rms
with poor corporate governance. This interpretation is reinforced by our results, to be presented
later, that ETC has a signi￿cantly more positive e⁄ect on ￿rm performance when the ￿rm has ￿red
a senior manager.
The coe¢ cient estimates when we use city dummies to control for city-level characteristics
are reported in Column (7). The only noticeable di⁄erence in the coe¢ cient estimate between
the speci￿cation in Column (6) and (7) is that the coe¢ cient of ￿Government Help￿ variable
becomes slightly less negative (from ￿:006 to ￿:004) and is no longer statistically signi￿cant, with
a t-statistics of 1.33. This is to be expected because ￿Government Help￿ has a non-negligible
city-speci￿c dimension.28
Finally we would like to investigate whether ETC, particularly the managerial excess xc com-
ponent of ETC, is deliberately a substitute for regulated CEO pay, and it is part of the optimal
CEO incentive structure. To evaluate this hypothesis, Column (8) reports the regression results
from a speci￿cation in which we include two measures of CEO relative compensation: the ￿rst is
the logarithm of the ratio of CEO wages to the ￿rm￿ s average wage; and the second is the logarithm
of the ratio of the CEO wages to the average wage of the ￿rm￿ s mid-level managers. These ratios
measure how well the CEOs are paid. Higher ratios would indicate that ETC is less likely a part
of the implicit CEO pay. If the implicit CEO pay hypothesis is true, we would expect a statisti-
cally signi￿cant negative relationship between these relative wage ratios and ETC. The results in
Column (8) does not support the view that ETC is entirely a form of CEO pay because ETC is
not statistically correlated with either relative wage measure.
To summarize, in light of the identi￿cation strategy developed in Proposition 1, regression
results we presented in Table 2 strongly support the view that ETC consists of multiple components
among Chinese ￿rms. It certainly is related to normal business travel and (weakly) related to the
building of relational capital with suppliers and clients. It includes both ￿grease money￿bribery to
obtain better quality of government service and ￿protection money￿bribery in exchange for lower
tax burdens. The evidence does not support the hypothesis that ETC is a substitute for regulated
CEO pay.
28When we regress ￿Government Help￿on city dummies, the R
2 is .173. Therefore, there are clearly both ￿rm-
speci￿c and city-speci￿c dimensions to the ￿Government Help￿variable.
175 ETC and Firm Performance
In this section, we examine the impact of ETC on ￿rm performance to shed further light
on the nature of ETC. Because ETC expenditures are chosen by the ￿rm managers, we expect
the marginal e⁄ect of ETC on ￿rm performance to respond to the proxy variables ￿Government
Help￿(for K0
g), ￿Tax Burden in the Previous Year￿(for K0
p), ￿Years of Relationship￿(for K0
r)
and the corporate governance proxies ￿Private Ownership￿and ￿Managerial Dismissal.￿ To the
extent that some components of ETC are chosen to improve government quality service, to lower
government expropriation, and to strengthen relationship with suppliers and clients, our theory
naturally predicts that the returns to ETC should be higher when ￿Government Help￿(proxying
K0
g) and ￿Years of Relationship￿ (proxying for K0
r) are low, and ￿Tax Burden in the Previous
Year￿ (for K0
p) is high; moreover, we also expect that ￿rms with better corporate governance
should exhibit higher returns to ETC because ETC in these ￿rms is more likely spent to improve
￿rm performance instead of managerial excesses.
To test the above implications on the e⁄ect of ETC on ￿rm performance, we estimate the
following two regression equations:
Yijc = ￿1jINDj + ￿2Xc + ￿3Zi + ￿4Xi + ￿5ETCi + ￿ijc; (9)
Yijc = ￿1jINDj + ￿2Xc + ￿3Zi + ￿4Xi + ￿5ETCi + ￿6ETCi ￿ Xi + ￿ijc; (10)
where the dependent variable Yijc is a performance measure for ￿rm i in industry j located in
city c. In our empirical analysis we focus on two performance measures. The ￿rst is the ratio
of pro￿t over sales (POS henceforth) and the second is the ￿rm￿ s total factor productivity (TFP
henceforth).29 The vector of ￿rm level characteristics Zi and Xi are the same as in the previous
section. Both regression speci￿cations (9) and (10) estimate the e⁄ect of Xi variables on ￿rm
performance, allowing us to directly test the predictions of Proposition 2; it also estimates how
ETC a⁄ects ￿rm performance. However, by including interaction terms of ETC and the key Xi
variables, speci￿cation (10) estimates how the private returns to ETC vary with the environmental
variables in the vector Xi: In this speci￿cation the e⁄ect of ETC on ￿rm performance Yijc depends
on Xi because @Yijc=@ETCi = ￿5 + ￿6Xi.
29We estimate the ￿rm￿ s TFP using various empirical methods in the empirical productivity literature. Table 4
below uses TFP estimates from running log of valued added on logs of capital stock and labor, both interacted with
industry dummies, and allowing for industry-speci￿c intercepts. That is, we estimate industry-speci￿c production
functions. We also report almost identical results using alternative estimates of TFP below.
18Before we present the estimation results, we note that ETC is an endogenous variable. If there
are omitted factors that a⁄ect both a ￿rm￿ s ETC and its performance, the OLS estimates will be
inconsistent. In the GMM speci￿cations we report below, for each ￿rm i0s ETC we create three
instruments: the ￿rst is the average ETC in ￿rm i0s city and industry; the second is square of the
city-industry average; and the third is the average ETC in ￿rm i0s district and industry.30; 31 We
exclude ￿rm i0s own ETC in computing both the city- and district-industry averages. The choice of
the instruments is justi￿ed by our theoretical model. In Section 2, we showed that a ￿rm￿ s ￿grease
money￿ bribery x￿
g is a function of government service quality K0
g, and its ￿protection money￿
bribery x￿
p is a function of K0
p: To the extent there are unobserved components in K0
g and K0
p
that are not captured by their respective proxies, and with which ￿rms within the same city (or
district) and industry commonly deal, their expenditures x￿
g and x￿
p should be correlated. Because
x￿
g and x￿
p are components of a ￿rm￿ s ETC, we expect that ￿rms￿ETC will also be correlated within
the same group.32 We ￿nd that the averages are clearly correlated with a ￿rm￿ s ETC: the three
instrumental variables are highly statistically signi￿cant in the ￿rst stage regression, and we will
present evidence later that they appear to be strong instruments in the sense of Bound, Jager and
Baker [6]. Moreover it is plausible that these instruments are not correlated with other ￿rm-speci￿c
performance shocks after controlling for city, industry, and other ￿rm characteristics.33
5.1 Pro￿t/Sales Ratio
Table 3 reports the regression results of the e⁄ects of ETC on POS under various speci￿cations.
Column (1) is the basic OLS regression without including any endogenous variables. Most of
the coe¢ cient estimates are consistent with the predictions in Proposition 2 on ￿rm performance.
Indeed, ￿rms with longer relationship with suppliers and clients (proxy for K0
r) have higher POS.34
30District is one administrative level below the city, and there are typically 10 districts in each city. District
government o¢ cials often have some discretion over the ￿rm.
31The quadratic term for the district-industry average is not included because it does not have predictive power in
the ￿rst stage regression. The three included instruments are all statistically signi￿cant in the ￿rst stage regression.
32These arguments are similar to those of Nevo [22], who argued that regional average prices (excluding the city
being instrumented) can be used as an instrument for the city-level price because both prices respond to the product￿ s
common marginal cost.
33We have also experimented with using only the city-industry average of ETC and its square as instruments, and
the qualitative conclusions remain similar.
34This ￿nding suggests that private contracting relationships are very valuable to Chinese ￿rms, which is likely
attributable to the weak ￿contracting institutions￿in China.
19Firms with better government service (proxy for K0
g) also have higher POS, though the e⁄ect is not
statistically signi￿cant. On the other hand, ￿rms with higher lagged tax burden (proxy for K0
p) has
lower POS. All these ￿ndings are exactly in line with Proposition 2. Column (1) also shows that
￿rms located in richer cities, as well as those that are larger, younger and more privately owned,
have higher POS.
[Table 3 About Here]
Column (2) and (3) are respectively the OLS and GMM version of speci￿cation (9). Comparison
of Column (1) and (2) shows that the addition of ETC only cause minor changes in the coe¢ cient
estimates of all other variables. The key result here is that ETC has a signi￿cantly negative e⁄ect
on POS in the OLS speci￿cation (Column 2); however, as we instrument for ETC, the negative
e⁄ect of ETC on POS is no longer signi￿cant (Column 3).
Column (4) reports the OLS version of speci￿cation (10). The coe¢ cient estimates for previously
included variables remain qualitatively stable. Notice from the comparison of Column (2) and (4),
the e⁄ect of ETC becomes insigni￿cant, though still negative, when we add interactions of ETC
with Xi: The OLS estimates of the coe¢ cients ￿6 is interesting. They imply that the returns
from ETC on POS are higher for ￿rms that have better corporate governance (as re￿ ected by
￿Private Ownership￿and ￿Managerial Dismissal￿ ), and for ￿rms that are subject to more severer
government expropriation (as proxied by ￿Tax Burden￿ ). On the other hand, ￿rms that have better
baseline relationship with suppliers and clients (as proxied by ￿Years of Relationship￿ ) and better
baseline government service quality (as proxied by ￿Government Help￿ ) experience lower, though
statistically insigni￿cant, returns of ETC on POS. These coe¢ cient estimates are consistent with
the implications of our model as described in detail in the beginning of Section 5.
Column (5) is the GMM version of speci￿cation (10) and it is our preferred speci￿cation. The
qualitative results from the GMM estimation are very similar to the OLS estimates as reported in
Column (4). Column (6) is identical to Column (5) except that we use city dummies, instead of
ln(GDP_PCc); as the city characteristics Xc: The qualitative results are again similar, with the
exception that the returns to ETC on POS are lower for ￿rms with higher ￿Private Ownership￿in
this speci￿cation.
It is worth noting that for the GMM speci￿cations (Columns 3, 5, and 6), our instruments pass
a variety of speci￿cation tests. The p-values for the over-identifying restrictions test, Hansen￿ s J
test, are all greater than :10. The instruments thus appear to be orthogonal to the error term in
Equation (9). The instruments are reasonably strong in the sense of Bound, Jager and Baker [6]:
20the F-test statistics for the test of the joint statistical signi￿cance of the excluded instruments are
almost always greater than 10, and the marginal R2 are also quite reasonable relative to those in
Bound, Jager and Baker [6] that yield reasonable IV estimates.35
5.2 TFP
Table 4 reports the regression results of the e⁄ects of ETC on ￿rm TFP. The dependent variable
in these regressions is ￿rm TFP, which is estimated from the residual in the regression of the
logarithm of a ￿rm￿ s value-added on the logarithm of capital stock and the logarithm of the number
of employees, allowing for industry speci￿c Cobb-Douglas production function.36; 37
[Tables 4 About Here]
Column (1) reports the results from the basic OLS regression. The coe¢ cient estimates for most
of the control variables Zi and Xi have the expected sign consistent with Proposition 2.38 In fact,
the signs of the coe¢ cient estimates are almost the same as those for POS as reported in Column
(1) of Table 3, except for the two corporate governance variables. We ￿nd earlier that ￿Private
Ownership￿has a strong positive e⁄ect on ￿rm POS (see Table 3), but here we ￿nd that ￿Private
Ownership￿does not appear to directly a⁄ect TFP, as the coe¢ cient is negative but statistically
insigni￿cant; in contrast, we ￿nd earlier that ￿Managerial Dismissal￿dummy has a statistically
insigni￿cant e⁄ect on POS, but here we ￿nd that it has a robust positive e⁄ect on TFP. Another
di⁄erence between Column (1) in Table 3 and 4 is the signi￿cance of ￿Tax Burden￿ : we ￿nd earlier
that ￿Tax Burden￿appears to have a statistically insigni￿cant e⁄ect on POS, but here we ￿nd that
it has a robust and negative e⁄ect on TFP.
Columns (2) and (3) are respectively the OLS and GMM version of speci￿cation (9). The
coe¢ cient estimates for previously included variables are similar to those in Column (1). Similar
to the e⁄ect of ETC on POS reported in Table 3, we ￿nd that ETC has a strong negative e⁄ect
on TFP: increasing ETC by one standard deviation (.062) reduces TFP by .29 and .46, based
respectively on the OLS and GMM estimates.
35These comments are also applicable to GMM estimations reported in Table 4 and 6.
36The industry-speci￿c coe¢ cients of production factors tend to be signi￿cant, and most sectors exhibit constant
or decreasing returns to scale.
37In Section 5.4 we report the regression results where TFP is estimated using alternative methods.
38Note that ln(Number of Employees) is not in the regressions because it has been used in estimating the ￿rm￿ s
TFP.
21Column (4) and (5) are respectively the OLS and GMM version of speci￿cation (10).39 Similar
to POS, we ￿nd that the e⁄ect of ETC on TFP becomes insigni￿cant, though still negative, when
we add interactions of ETC with Xi: Column (4) and (5) indicate, again consistent with our model,




well as the corporate governance proxies. Remarkably the signs of the estimates for the coe¢ cient in
￿6 for TFP are identical to those for POS. Column (6) reports the GMM regression that is identical
to Column (5) except that city dummies are used instead of ln(GDP_PCc) for city characteristics
Xc: The results are qualitatively similar to those in Column (5).
5.3 Marginal E⁄ects of Xi on the Returns to ETC
In this section we use the coe¢ cient estimates from our preferred GMM estimation from
Columns (5) in Tables 3 and 4 to summarize the marginal e⁄ects of ETC on POS and TFP, evalu-
ated at the mean of the variable list Xi: From speci￿cation (10), we have @Y=@ETC = ￿5 +￿6￿ Xi:
[Table 5 About Here]
Panel A of Table 5 reports that, calculated at the means of all the Xi variables, increasing
ETC by one percentage point will lower ￿rms￿POS by 4.43 percentage points and TFP by 22.02
percentage points. Both negative e⁄ects are statistically signi￿cant.
Panel B of Table 5 shows that the marginal e⁄ect of ETC on POS and TFP vary with the level
of the variables in the list Xi: In calculating the numbers in this panel, we take one variable at a
time from the list Xi and set it at a level either higher or lower by one standard deviation from
its mean, while holding other variables in the list Xi at their sample means. Comparing the e⁄ects
reported in Rows (1) and (2) in Panel B with the corresponding numbers in Panel A, we see that
￿rms with better corporate governance makes the negative return to ETC on both POS and TFP
less negative, suggesting that a smaller component of ETC expenditures is managerial excesses in
better-governed ￿rms. Similarly Rows (3)-(5) indicates that the returns to ETC on both POS and
TFP are less negative in ￿rms that are in stronger need to strengthen the relationship with suppliers
and clients, in ￿rms that are more severely expropriated by government tax o¢ cials, and in those
who experience lower baseline quality of government service. Most of these e⁄ects are statistically
signi￿cant at lower than 10 percent level. These ￿ndings strongly support our theoretical prediction
as detailed in the beginning of this section.
39In empirical implementation, we do not include ETC ￿ ￿Sell to Other Provinces￿ dummy because it is never
statistically signi￿cant in any speci￿cation.
225.4 Robustness
[Table 6 About Here]
Table 6 presents GMM estimates for speci￿cation (10) with di⁄erent measures of ￿rm perfor-
mance. Column (1) is the replicate of Column (5) in Table 3 with the exception that we drop the
￿rms whose POS are in top and bottom 5 percentile. The results are almost identical to those
reported in Column (5) of Table 3, thus they are not driven by outliers. Column (2)-(4) provide
the estimates of ETC on TFP where TFP are estimated using alternative methods. The dependent
variable in Column (2) is ￿rms￿TFP estimated from a translog value-added production function.40
The dependent variable in Column (3) is ￿rms￿TFP estimated from a Cobb-Douglas output pro-
duction function.41 All three procedures of estimating TFP do not take into account the potential
endogeneity of capital and labor with respect to productivity, a concern pointed out by Griliches
and Mareisse [11]. Column (4) estimates ￿rms￿TFP using Levinsohn and Petrin￿ s [17] proposed
procedure to use intermediate inputs as instruments.42 The results are remarkably robust across
Columns (2)-(5), both qualitatively and quantitatively, suggesting that our results are not sensitive
to the particular way to estimate a ￿rm￿ s TFP.
To summarize, our analysis of the e⁄ects of ETC on ￿rm performance provides strong support
for our earlier ￿ndings about the composition of ETC. A signi￿cant portion of ETC is bribes to
government o¢ cials, both for protection against government expropriation and in exchange for
better government service. Accordingly, in situations with more severe government expropriation
and a lower quality of government service, ETC tends to be higher and have a higher marginal return
to ￿rm performance. Managers also spend a portion of ETC on managerial excesses, as shown by
the fact that ETC have a signi￿cantly negative e⁄ect on ￿rm performance. These qualitative results
are fairly robust to various functional forms and control variables.
40That is, a ￿rm￿ s TFP is the residual from industry speci￿c regression of the logarithm of value-added on the
logarithms of captial and labor as well as their quadratic terms.
41That is, a ￿rm￿ s TFP is the residual from industry-speci￿c regression of the logarithm of its total sales (instead
of value-added) on the logarithms of capital, labor and material inputs.
42We use the procedure suggested by Petrin, Levinsohn and Poi [25] to compute TFP within the value added
Cobb-Douglas framework.
236 Conclusion
We use large unique ￿rm-level data sets from China to not only detect but also investigate
the institutional causes of corruption among Chinese ￿rms. We also examine how the private
returns to ￿rms from corruptive activities vary with institutional factors. Besides other detailed
￿rm- and city-level information, the most important feature of our data set is that it contains
objective information about Entertainment and Travel Costs (ETC), a standard expenditure item
in the accounting book of Chinese ￿rms that is widely used as the account to reimburse corruptive
expenditures. We rely on the predictions from a simple but plausible model of managerial decision-
making to identify components of ETC by examining how the total ETC responds to di⁄erent
environmental variables. In our empirical analysis we ￿nd strong evidence that ￿rms￿ETC consists
of a mix that includes expenditures on government o¢ cials both as ￿grease money￿and ￿protection
money,￿expenditures to build relational capital with suppliers and clients, and managerial excesses.
ETC overall has a signi￿cantly negative e⁄ect on ￿rm performance (measured by both pro￿tability
and productivity), but its negative e⁄ect is much less pronounced for those ￿rms located in cities
with low quality government service, those subject to severe government expropriation and those
who do not have strong relationship with their suppliers and clients.43 We also ￿nd that the
negative impact of ETC is less pronounced in ￿rms with better corporate governance.
Our empirical ￿ndings have important implications on the role of corruption in developing
and transitional economies, and on how to curb corruption ￿ a global priority as proposed by
the Copenhagen Consensus (Rose-Ackerman [28]). First, despite the overall negative e⁄ect of
ETC on ￿rm performance, we ￿nd that components of ETC are spent productively as ￿grease
money￿ and ￿protection money￿ and these components do generate positive private returns to
￿rms. This is in stark contrast to the typical ￿ndings in the growth literature that corruption
is correlated with lower economic growth (see, e.g., Mauro [19]). Our paper echoes the message
of Acemoglu and Johnson [1] in demonstrating that corruption is a⁄ected by various institutional
factors and as a result a negative overall correlation between corruption and ￿rm performance does
not necessarily indicate that all corruption components worsen ￿rm performance. Second, while
we ￿nd that parts of ETC expenditures have positive impact on ￿rm performance, it does not
necessarily imply that, these components of ETC expenditures are socially ￿e¢ cient grease.￿ Our
￿nding implies that in economies with weak institutions ￿rms may ￿nd it individually rational
43In the terminology of Acemoglu and Johnson [1], our ￿ndings suggest that Chinese ￿rms react to both weak
￿property right institutions￿and weak ￿contracting institutions￿by ETC expenditures.
24to pay bribes and government o¢ cials ￿nd it individually rational to accept bribes. However, to
evaluate the social e¢ ciency of bribes, we have to take into account the possibility that bribing and
government institutions are determined jointly in equilibrium. If, for example, government o¢ cials
were intentionally lowering their service quality to extort more bribes, then banning corruption in
the whole economy can improve the quality of government service (see Prendergast [26]).
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27A Appendix: Proof of Proposition 1.
Proof. Consider the manager￿ s optimization problem (7). The ￿rst order condition with respect to
xc, assuming interior solution, is:
￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿cx￿
c = ln[￿￿ (￿￿ + ￿c)V ]: (11)




￿￿’￿ ￿ ln[￿￿ (￿￿ + ￿c)V ]
￿￿ + ￿c
(12)





















Q ￿ (xr + xg + xp) (13)
is the ￿rm￿ s cash ￿ ow gross of the managerial excess x￿
c. Thus managerial excess increases in the
￿rm￿ s cash ￿ ow, decreases in monitoring intensity ￿c, discount factor ￿ and continuation value of
employment V .
Since (xr;xg;xp) appear in the manager￿ s objective function (7) only via net pro￿t ￿; their
optimal levels will maximize the net pro￿t ￿ (or equivalently, maximize the cash ￿ ow ’ because
xc does not interact with other components of ETC).
To prove A1 of Proposition 1, note that, for i 2 fr;p;gg when ai = 0, any positive level of xi
has no e⁄ect on revenue but decreases pro￿t. Thus it is optimal to choose x￿
i = 0.
To prove A2, consider i = g for example. When ag = 0, we know from A1 that x￿




g. Suppose ar and ap are positive and su¢ ciently large. Examining the net
pro￿t function (5) reveals that it is supermodular as a function of xr and xp, and it satis￿es the
increasing di⁄erence property in Kg = K0
g (since x￿
g = 0): Thus comparative statics results from
Milgrom and Shannon [20] implies that x￿
r and x￿
p must be (weakly) increasing in K0
g. Furthermore
the optimal level of cash ￿ ow ’￿ described by (13) is increasing in K0
g (regardless of whether ar
and ap are zero or not), as a result of the Generalized Envelope Theorem of Milgrom and Segal
[21]. Thus, following (12) x￿
c must always be increasing in K0
g. Therefore, the total ETC, which is




g; is increasing in K0
g. Assertion A3 is proved analogously.
B1 of Proposition 1 is obvious. To prove B2, again consider the case i = g. From B1, we know
that when ag is positive and su¢ ciently large, the optimal level of xg is positive. Since xg > 0, we





















28Thus we can think of the manager￿ s problem as choosing xp;xr and Kg to maximize ’ above.
Note that K0













decreases linearly in K0




1 is a term that is independent of K0
g: This second implication, together with (12) implies
that the optimal level of managerial excess x￿











2 is a collection of terms that are independent of K0














3 is a term independent of K0
g. Thus the total ETC is decreasing in K0
g. Assertion B3 is
proved analogously.
B Appendix: Proof of Proposition 2.




maximize the ￿rm￿ s cash ￿ ow (13). Thus by Envelope Theorem, the ￿rm￿ s cash ￿ ow at these
optimal choices ’￿ must be increasing in K0
r and K0
g; and be decreasing in K0
p: The ￿rm￿ s net




c is simply the di⁄erence between ’￿ and x￿
c: By
(12), we have
￿￿ = ’￿ ￿ x￿
c =
￿c’￿ + ln[￿￿ (￿￿ + ￿c)V ]
￿￿ + ￿c
:


























Figure 1: The Geographic Coverage of the Surveys.  
 
Note: Only the 18 cities in the first survey are marked. The other 13 cities, not shown due to the space 
constraint, are all clustered around Benxi and Dalian in Liaoning province. The cities are grouped into five 
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ETC Entertainment and Travel Costs over Total Sales 0.026 0.062
POS Total Profits over Total Sales -0.106 0.646
Sell to Other Provinces A dummy variable for whether the firm sells to other provinces 0.584 0.493
Ln(GDP_PC) Logarithm of GDP per capita in a city 9.567 0.458
Ln(Number of Employees) Logarithm of the number of employees 4.866 1.483
Ln(Firm Age) Logarithm of Firm Age plus one 2.305 0.878
Private Ownership Share of private ownership, both domestic and foreign 0.350 0.455
Managerial Dismissal
A dummy variable indicating if a general manager or deputy manager has 
been fired in the previous four years
0.187 0.390
Ln(Years of Relationship)
The logarithm of the number of years that the firm has known its main 
client plus the number of years the firm has known its main supplier
2.073 0.333
Government Help
The share of government officials that are helpful to the development of this 
firm 
0.364 0.334
Tax Burden The ratio of Total Tax over Total Sales in the previous year 0.072 0.101
Ln(CEO_Worker Wage Ratio) The logarithm of the ratio of the CEO’s wage to the average worker wage 1.004 0.752
Ln(CEO_Mid Wage Ratio)
The logarithm of the ratio of the CEO’s wage to the average wage of mid-
level managers
0.604 0.608
Note: The number of observations for various variables ranges from 3,104 to 3,468.                                                          Table 2: Determinants of ETC: OLS Regressions.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Ln(GDP_PC) -0.005 -0.005 -0.004 -0.005 -0.004 -0.004
(0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)** (0.002)** (0.002)** (0.002)**
Ln(Number of Employees) -0.007 -0.007 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.005 -0.006
(0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)***
Ln(Firm Age) 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Sell to Other Provinces 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.005
(0.002)** (0.002)** (0.002)** (0.002)** (0.002)** (0.002)** (0.002)* (0.003)*
Private Ownership -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 0.000 0.001
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Managerial Dismissal 0.008 0.008 0.009 0.008 0.009
(0.002)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.004)**
Ln(Years of Relationship) -0.006 -0.007 -0.006 -0.007 -0.006
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Government Help -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.004 -0.011
(0.003)** (0.003)** (0.003)* (0.003) (0.004)**
Tax Burden 0.106 0.098 0.095 0.096
(0.036)*** (0.038)** (0.038)** (0.045)**
Ln(CEO_Worker Wage Ratio) 0.005
(0.003)
Ln(CEO_Mid Wage Ratio) -0.005
(0.004)
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
City dummies No No No No No No Yes Yes
R-squared 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.09 0.09
Observations 3426 3425 3080 3239 2934 2916 2916 1863
Notes:
(1). The dependent variable is ETC; 
(2). *, ** and *** represent statistical significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent levels respectively;
(3) Standard deviations are in parentheses.                                               Table 3: Effects of ETC on POS.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OLS GMM OLS GMM GMM
Ln(GDP_PC) 0.057 0.035 0.026 0.031 0.015
(0.023)** (0.019)* (0.013)** (0.019)* (0.014)
Ln(Number of Employees) 0.031 0.023 0.019 0.018 0.005 0.014
(0.009)*** (0.009)*** (0.010)** (0.009)** (0.013) (0.013)
Ln(Firm Age) -0.091 -0.093 -0.083 -0.087 -0.074 -0.079
(0.017)*** (0.016)*** (0.010)*** (0.016)*** (0.011)*** (0.011)***
Sell to Other Provinces 0.007 0.029 0.026 0.027 0.045 0.023
(0.028) (0.027) (0.022) (0.027) (0.022)** (0.021)
Private Ownership 0.128 0.113 0.101 0.041 0.077 0.109
(0.025)*** (0.023)*** (0.016)*** (0.030) (0.039)** (0.041)***
Managerial Dismissal -0.006 0.018 0.021 -0.059 -0.053 -0.049
(0.025) (0.022) (0.020) (0.040) (0.029)* (0.027)*
Ln(Years of Relationship) 0.063 0.055 0.069 0.08 0.143 0.121
(0.033)* (0.033)* (0.026)*** (0.032)** (0.039)*** (0.040)***
Government Help 0.053 0.03 0.017 0.059 0.085 0.082
(0.035) (0.033) (0.022) (0.047) (0.057) (0.056)
Tax Burden -0.18 -0.014 0.007 -0.109 -0.154 -0.17
(0.225) (0.220) (0.201) (0.230) (0.150) (0.149)
ETC -1.721 -1.695 -2.477 1.422 1.879
(0.714)** (1.687) (1.765) (1.712) (1.747)
ETC * Private Ownership 3.209 0.854 -0.345
(1.096)*** (1.524) (1.604)
ETC * Managerial Dismissal 3.184 3.6 2.756
(1.654)* (1.474)** (1.413)*
ETC * Tax Burden 2.467 4.414 2.239
(1.420)* (2.743) (2.963)
ETC* Ln(Years of Relationship) -0.742 -2.75 -1.869
(0.824) (1.208)** (1.224)
ETC * Government Help -1.391 -3.947 -2.398
(2.034) (2.487) (2.453)
Industry dummies? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
City dummies? No No No No No Yes
R-squared 0.04 0.06 0.09
P-value of Hansen’s J Test 0.27 0.722 0.563
F-test for excluded IVs 12.82 9.2 14.6
Partial R square * 100 0.63 4.98 4.02
Observations 2910 2905 2888 2905 2888 2888
Notes:
(1). *, ** and *** represent statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels respectively.
(2). Standard deviations are in parentheses for OLS specifications. 
 (3). For the GMM estimation, when ETC is not interacted with other variables, the instruments are the average ETC for 
the city-industry cell (excluding the firm itself) and its square, and the average ETC for the district-industry cell 
(excluding the firm itself).  When ETC is interacted with other variables (say X), the instruments additionally include the 
three IVs for ETC interacted with X.
(4) The Hansen's J test, F test and partial R square for the GMM specifications are for the first stage ETC regression.  
The interaction-terms of ETC with other variables also have their first-stage regressions. The corresponding test statistics 
and partial R square are similar to those reported for ETC but not reported here.                               Table 4: Effects of ETC on TFP (Cobb-Douglas Specification).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OLS GMM OLS GMM GMM
Ln(GDP_PC) 0.382 0.366 0.39 0.361 0.349
(0.051)*** (0.049)*** (0.037)*** (0.049)*** (0.044)***
Ln(Firm Age) -0.42 -0.403 -0.352 -0.393 -0.306 -0.281
(0.031)*** (0.030)*** (0.022)*** (0.029)*** (0.029)*** (0.033)***
Sell to Other Provinces 0.395 0.419 0.431 0.428 0.524 0.497
(0.057)*** (0.056)*** (0.045)*** (0.055)*** (0.056)*** (0.069)***
Private Ownership -0.059 -0.049 -0.034 -0.136 -0.241 -0.338
-0.059 -0.057 -0.042 (0.063)** (0.109)** (0.133)**
Managerial Dismissal 0.099 0.12 0.151 0.108 0.028 -0.024
(0.054)* (0.053)** (0.048)*** (0.061)* (0.087) (0.089)
Ln(Years of Relationship) 0.347 0.333 0.387 0.378 0.656 0.624
(0.083)*** (0.082)*** (0.061)*** (0.087)*** (0.109)*** (0.134)***
Government Help 0.197 0.164 0.171 0.313 0.348 0.412
(0.073)*** (0.071)** (0.056)*** (0.084)*** (0.147)** (0.160)***
Tax Burden -1.766 -1.427 -1.196 -1.641 -2.203 -2.022
(0.332)*** (0.340)*** (0.356)*** (0.352)*** (0.389)*** (0.384)***
ETC -4.616 -7.344 -3.338 -2.32 -6.36
(0.789)*** (3.772)* (2.047) (5.638) (6.126)
ETC * Private Ownership 3.806 8.475 11.751
(1.088)*** (4.600)* (5.669)**
ETC *Managerial Dismissal 1.067 8.142 10.444
(1.152) (3.920)** (4.593)**
ETC * Tax Burden 4.609 31.496 33.636
(1.444)*** (8.746)*** (10.160)***
ETC * Ln(Years of Relationship) -1.343 -10.964 -10.856
(0.983) (3.516)*** (4.735)**
ETC * Government Help -7.037 -10.255 -10.88
(1.893)*** (6.970) (7.714)
Industry dummies? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
City dummies? No No No No No Yes
R-squared 0.69 0.7 0.71
P-value of Hansen’s J test 0.151 0.347 0.308
F-test for excluded IVs 6.86 10.33 9.72
Partial R square * 100 0.7 5.64 5.28
Observations 2839 2834 2817 2834 2817 2817
Notes:
(2).  Standard deviations are in parentheses for OLS specifications. 
(1). *, ** and *** represent statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels respectively.
(3). For the GMM estimation, when ETC is not interacted with other variables, the instruments are the average ETC for the 
city-industry cell (excluding the firm itself) and its square, and the average ETC for the district-industry cell (excluding the 
firm itself).  When ETC is interacted with other variables (say X), the instruments additionally include the three IVs for 
ETC interacted with X.
(4) The Hansen's J test, F test and partial R square for the GMM specifications are for the first stage ETC regression.  The 
interaction-terms of ETC with other variables also have their first-stage regressions. The corresponding test statistics and 

















(1). Columns 1 and 2 are based on the estimates of columns (5) of Tables 3 and 4, respectively.  
(2). Standard errors are in parenthesis.
(3). *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels respectively.
(4). See the text for how the marginal effects in Panel B are calculated.
Panel A: At the mean of all X variables
    (5)    Decrease “Government Help” by one standard deviation
    (1)    Increase “Private Ownership” by one standard deviation
    (2)    Increase “Managerial Dismissal” by one standard deviation
    (3)    Decrease “Ln(Years of Relationship)” by one standard deviation
     (4)   Increase “Tax Burden” by one standard deviation               Table 6: Effect of ETC on Firm Performance: Robustness Checks.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Firm Performance Measure POS TFP TFP TFP
Ln(GDP_PC) 0.014 0.346 0.326 0.384
(0.014) (0.044)*** (0.042)*** (0.057)***
Ln(Firm Age) -0.073 -0.295 -0.312 -0.246
(0.011)*** (0.029)*** (0.024)*** (0.029)***
Sell to Other Provinces 0.048 0.513 0.421 0.599
(0.022)** (0.055)*** (0.051)*** (0.057)***
Private Ownership 0.078 -0.228 -0.124 -0.383
(0.040)** (0.110)** (0.113) (0.112)***
Managerial Dismissal -0.057 0.03 0.01 0.069
(0.029)* (0.086) (0.081) (0.105)
Ln(Years of Relationship) 0.146 0.669 0.614 0.745
(0.040)*** (0.108)*** (0.099)*** (0.111)***
Government Help 0.096 0.287 0.38 0.431
(0.058)* (0.144)** (0.156)** (0.175)**
Tax Burden -0.122 -2.272 -2.512 -2.507
(0.152) (0.382)*** (0.289)*** (0.464)***
ETC 1.688 -1.634 3.482 -8.153
(1.743) (5.546) (5.727) (6.453)
ETC * Private Ownership 0.689 8.271 4.119 16.154
(1.556) (4.625)* (4.791) (5.290)***
ETC * Managerial Dismissal 3.881 7.435 8.301 10.314
(1.503)*** (3.832)* (3.329)** (4.527)**
ETC * Tax Burden 4.339 33.024 26.95 41.211
(2.795) (8.992)*** (5.696)*** (8.274)***
ETC * Ln(Years of Relationship) -2.915 -11.723 -12.589 -14.09
(1.226)** (3.560)*** (3.212)*** (3.770)***
ETC * Government Help -4.672 -7.057 -10.837 -13.994
(2.548)* (6.783) (7.356) (8.483)*
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Hansen's J statistics 0.716 0.528 0.213 0.147
Observations 2605 2817 2771 2817
Notes:
(1). All columns are GMM estimation results. 
(3). *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels respectively.
(4). Standard errors are in parenthesis.
(5). For colums (2)-(4), we also control for all e related factors for production functions whenever it 
applies, including Ln(Capital), Ln(Number of Employees), Ln(Material Inputs). See the text for 
more details.
(2). Column (1) is identical to Column (5) in Table 3 except that it excludes firms in the top and 
bottom 5 percentile of POS.
(6). For the GMM estimation, when ETC is not interacted with other variables, the instruments are 
the average ETC for the city-industry cell (excluding the firm itself) and its square, and the average 
ETC for the district-industry cell (excluding the firm itself).  When ETC is interacted with other 
variables (say X), the instruments additionally include the two IVs associated with ETC interacted 
with X.
Cobb-Douglas 
Output How is TFP estimated? Levinsohn-Petrin
Translog Value 
AddedChaoyang 8.167 0.014 0.054 0.186 7.668 0.387 0.449 -0.026 0.302
Fuxin 8.582 0.034 0.058 0.100 7.627 0.233 0.389 -0.227 -0.316
Tieling 8.670 0.038 0.057 0.143 8.268 0.358 0.271 -0.126 -0.149
Huludao 9.077 0.016 0.040 0.143 8.447 0.451 0.815 -0.174 0.016
Jinzou 9.111 0.021 0.051 0.243 8.904 0.307 0.360 -0.068 0.305
Dandong 9.163 0.025 0.058 0.271 9.090 0.301 0.261 -0.076 0.593
Guiyang 9.189 0.050 0.109 0.188 7.613 0.344 0.226 -0.096 -0.269
Yingkou 9.301 0.028 0.042 0.329 8.918 0.355 0.682 -0.049 0.176
Xi’an 9.375 0.032 0.082 0.193 7.582 0.324 0.279 -0.047 -0.037
Nanning 9.394 0.040 0.108 0.147 7.613 0.435 0.212 -0.204 -0.152
Nanchang 9.438 0.024 0.076 0.147 8.090 0.378 0.373 -0.004 -0.024
Liaoyang 9.447 0.018 0.059 0.300 8.559 0.335 0.707 -0.078 -0.049
Lanzhou 9.469 0.026 0.105 0.074 7.005 0.336 0.239 -0.078 -0.730
Chongqing 9.469 0.023 0.069 0.307 7.713 0.342 0.409 -0.107 -0.069
Haerbin 9.472 0.039 0.082 0.173 7.887 0.299 0.474 -0.196 -0.381
Benxi 9.497 0.029 0.092 0.129 7.367 0.332 0.249 -0.255 -0.646
Zhengzhou 9.517 0.022 0.062 0.127 7.552 0.521 0.364 -0.139 -0.111
Fushun 9.528 0.033 0.050 0.271 8.404 0.168 0.465 -0.135 0.223
Changsha 9.529 0.019 0.069 0.127 8.090 0.406 0.332 -0.163 -0.017
Wenzou 9.566 0.019 0.065 0.210 7.580 0.813 0.206 0.041 0.475
Kunming 9.602 0.016 0.073 0.113 7.912 0.367 0.343 -0.240 -0.425
Changchun 9.694 0.027 0.067 0.213 8.115 0.332 0.448 -0.098 0.094
Jiangmeng 9.761 0.008 0.058 0.170 7.490 0.297 0.535 -0.168 0.095
Wuhan 9.881 0.024 0.066 0.180 7.856 0.428 0.325 -0.069 0.068
Anshan 10.041 0.020 0.069 0.157 8.230 0.227 0.248 -0.239 0.203
Shenyang 10.042 0.031 0.073 0.225 8.329 0.165 0.210 -0.157 0.163
Dalian 10.197 0.023 0.074 0.228 8.434 0.223 0.225 -0.018 0.359
Panjin 10.206 0.015 0.067 0.171 8.173 0.371 0.609 -0.001 0.699
Hangzhou 10.245 0.024 0.061 0.270 8.279 0.338 0.498 0.002 0.727
Dalian Zone 10.270 0.024 0.077 0.243 9.038 0.206 0.289 -0.016 0.533
Shenzhen 10.745 0.012 0.046 0.250 8.389 0.237 0.367 0.052 0.735




                                         Table A1.  Averages of Key Variables Across Cities. 
Ln(GDP_PC)
Tax Burden in the 
Previous Year
Government 
Help
City ETC
Managerial 
Dismissal
Years of 
Relationship